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ABSTRACT 
The theory of rational behavior has several different uses. 
(i) It is used at the most fundamental level of experimental 
methodology to induce preferences used as parameters in models. 
(ii) It appears repeatedly in experimentally successful mathematical 
models of complex phenomena such as speculation, bidding and signaling. 
(iii) It is used as a tool to generate ex-post models of results that 
are otherwise inexplicable. (iv) It has been used as a tool to 
succesfully design new institutions to solve specific problems. When 
tested directly the theory can be rejected. It is retained because 
neither an alternative theory nor an alternative general principle 
accomplishes so much. 
RATIONAL CHOICE IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS 
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
The theory of rational individual choice has many different 
uses in experimental economics. The uses must be considered in any 
realistic evaluation of the theory. The paper is organized around 
that perspective. 
If the only question posed is "rational choice, true or false" 
then the answer is clearly "false, " Many critics of economics have 
claimed that the discipline is built on untestable foundations. 
Economists are indebted to psychologists for debunking such critics 
and demonstrating that the theory can indeed be tested, However, the 
gratitude can only go so far. During the process of demonstrating 
testability the psychologists disconfirmed the theory. Preference 
transitivity experiments (Tversky 1 969) and preference reversal 
experiments (Grether and Plott 1979) both demonstrate that the weakest 
forms of the classical preference hypothesis1 are systematically at 
odds wi th facts.
It follows that theories of markets for which rational 
individual choice is a necessary component are either disconfirmed by 
the same evidence or cannot be applied because the preconditions for 
application are not present. The logic is compelling and an awareness 
of its existence has colored how experimental economists pose 
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questions, how they do experiments, and what they conclude. If one 
wants only to "test" a theory in the sense of rejection, then one 
should examine its most suspect predictions. If, as part of its 
formulation of market behavior, a theory predicts acyclic individual 
choice behavior as is the case with almost all economics models,  then 
one seeking a disconfirmation of the theory knows exactly where to 
look and how to proceed. Existing experiments on individual choice 
behavior provide ample machinery. 
The rejection of a theory of markets on the terms described 
above is not an especially challenging research objective. Those who 
study experimental markets tend to pose the questions differently. 
Rather than inquire whether a theory is true or false they ask if the 
magnitude of error in the predictions of market phenomena is 
acceptable. Or, if no concept of degree of acceptability is readily 
available, the question becomes which of several competing models is 
the most accurate, fully realizing that the best model might still be 
"poor. " When confronted with data that suggest the existence of 
erratic or irrational individual behavior the question is immediately 
formulated in terms of the possible implications for a market level of 
analysis. Of course, when unusual market behavior is observed, one 
might then turn to models of irrational individual behavior to see if 
they contain the seeds of an explanation. 
In brief, it is almost impossible to as sess the importance of 
any problems with rationality postulates, as found in experimental 
market studies, without assessing the performance of the market models 
2 
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based on such postulates. In the first section below, I will discuss 
hypotheses about rational behavior that are built directly into the 
foundations of laboratory market procedures. In the second section, 
three examples of laboratory experiments will be discussed. The 
rationality postulates that form the structure of the models and the 
accuracy of the models will be covered, The third section will 
demonstrate how ideas of rationality can be used to explain otherwise 
very confusing market behavior. The fourth section will examine 
unusual phenomena that models of rational behavior suggest might 
exist. The final section will discuss some pending problems for 
concepts of rationality as currently used. 
I. LABORATORY MARKET PROCEDURES AND RATIONALITY 
For the most part, laboratory markets are created as a 
challenge to theory. One research objective is to construct simple 
markets that are special cases of the complicated phenomena to which 
the models are ordinarily applied, The relative accuracies of models 
are assessed. The models are changed in light of the data from the 
special case. It is hoped, as a result, that the revised models will 
be more useful when applied to the complex. While other research 
strategies can be identified (Plott 1982, esp. pp. 1519-1523) this 
particular strategy is frequently used. 
The above objective demands that laboratory economics 
procedures permit some reasonably direct correspondence between 
parameters of models and what is controlled in an experiment. The 
important variables of almost all economic models are preferences (as 
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opposed to sources of motivation), beliefs, resources, market 
organization (institutions), technology, commodities, prices, 
allocations, and incomes. If a model is to be evaluated, all of these 
variables need to be observed and sometimes controlled. If a variable 
cannot be observed directly, then it is always suspected of having 
gone awry when the model itself does not fit the data. Of course, in 
this context, the preferences and beliefs are key because (i) they can 
be used to explain almost any pattern of the other variables (Ledyard, 
1984) , and (ii) they cannot be observed directly. 
Laboratory techniques control preferences, or in a sense allow 
them to be observed indirectly. The basic insight is that preferences 
are parameters to economic models but the source of preferences is not 
a parameter. The key ictea is to use monetary incentives to induce 
preferences for abstract commodities that exist only for the purpose 
of the experiment. Consider the following axioms, which are a 
combination of the precepts used by Smith (1976) and the axioms used 
by Plott (1979) , If the axioms are accepted, then preferences can be 
induced and controlled for purposes of experimentation. 
1. 
2. 
More reward medium (money) is preferred to less, other things 
being equal (salience and nonsatiation). 
Individuals place no independent value on experimental outcomes 
other than that provided by the reward medium (neutrality). 
3. Individuals optimize. 
Suppose for example that a commodity is the set of nonnegative 
integers which are called units of the commodity X. Another 
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commodity, Y, is simpl y U. S. currency. An individual i is assigned a 
function Ri(x) indicating the reward (dollar amount) he wil l receive 
from the experimenter shoul d he acquire x units of the commodity. If 
postulates (1) , (2) , and (3) are satisfied then we can take as a 
parameter in a model defined over X • Y where the operation • is a 
Cartesian product, the binary rel ation Pi defined by
(x, y) Pi(x', y' ) <=> Ri(x) + y > Ri(x
1) + y'. Pi is the preference 
rel ation of i, If the axioms are satisfied then Pi is in fact the
individual 's preference rel ation in the same sense that it wil l  
reflect actual individual choices from pairs i n  X • Y. Since the 
experimenter control s the functional form of Ri(•) , the preference 
rel ation of each individual can be control led as desired. 
Carrying the example further we could view Ri(x) - Ri(x - 1)
as the wil lingness to pay for additional units of X .  In  some 
circumstances the difference woul d be interpreted as an (inverse) 
demand function. That is, suppose p is a constant price that a 
subject must pay for units of X. An optimizing subject would want to 
maximize Ri(x) - px. The optimum occurs (ignoring the probl em caused
by the discrete formulation) at the point � such that 
A 
Sol ving the equation for x we obtain a 
A 
function x = Di(p) which can be interpreted as an individual demand 
function for X .  
Notice that if any o f  (1) , (2) , or (3) is not satisfied then a 
key parameter is misspecified, When asked to choose over X • Y, the 
subject's choices would not be those predicted by Pi. If this occurs 
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and if the experimenter is not aware of the probl em, a model might be 
discarded as inaccurate when in fact the experiment was not properl y 
controlled, The point to be emphasized is that a theory of 
rational ity is basic to experimental procedures and to the 
interpretation of the results. If rationality is not rel iabl e 
behaviorall y, then one woul d expect economic model s to be poor 
predictors of experimental market behavior because the basic 
parameters of the economic model s woul d not be control labl e. 
6 
The nature of the argument just outlined suggests a first line 
of defense that can be used by anyone whose pet theory has been abused 
by experimental data. Were the payoffs of a sort that assures that 
(1) is satisfied? For the most part economists have used money in 
amounts that wil l accumulate to amounts comparabl e to wage rates (for 
equivalent time) of employed members of the subject pool s. Typical ly 
this amount is between $8.00 and $20.00 per hour. A fail ure to 
provide adequate incentives is known to affect resul ts at a group 
l evel of performance in ways that do not disappear with l arge 
samples. 2 Results regarding the importance of incentives when
studying individual choices have been mixed, For exampl e, Grether and 
Plott (1979) found us incentive effects. The most recent study is by 
Grether (1981) who demonstrated that the instances of seemingl y 
confused behavior go up when incentives go down. 
The second postulate substantial ly differentiates those who 
study markets from those who study individual s. Psychol ogists 
frequentl y use rich descriptions of situations to elicit responses. 
C. R. Plott March 1986 
From an economist's point of view this practice is one that is to be 
viewed with suspicion. 3 Data that l ead to a model 's rejection can 
al ways be expl ained away by hypotheses that take advantage of any 
ambiguity that might exist over what preferences "really" existed in 
the experiment. 
7 
The final condition (3) depends not onl y upon human nature, 
but also whether or not the subject understands the rel ationship 
Ri(·) . This function is seldom simpl y verbal ly communicated to the
subject. If the function invol ves random el ements, they are made 
operational with real random devices (the word probabil ity is not 
used) . Subjects are given experience with the properties of Ri(•) and 
tested on their understanding of it. Sometimes the instructions of a 
compl icated market experiment invol ve exercises in which subjects 
choose over X • Y or its equival ent as a check on (1) , (2) , and (3) , 
Whil e these precautions are taken as a defense against disgruntl ed 
theorists who might dismiss resul ts on the (sel f serving) claim that 
the preferences were not controll ed, they also comment on impl icit 
assumptions about the nature of rational ity. Intel ligence is 
important. Verbal communication is suspect. Anal ytical and cognitive 
abil ities are not dependable over experience. So, the experiment 
proceeds al lowing for the possibil ity that individual s might be 
satisficers in the Simon (1979) sense and fail to explore the nature 
of Ri(x) if left to their own devices, 
Acknowledged problems with the concept of rational choice have 
shaped experimental market procedures in stil l a third way that was 
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mentioned in the opening paragraphs, Al most all economic model s 
postulate the existence (on an "as if" basis) of a transitive 
preference over l otteries, Thus transitive choice over lotteries can 
be viewed as a prediction made by the model s. We know from Tversky'B 
(1969) work on transitivity and from preference reversal experiments 
(Grether and Plott 1979) that those particular predictions of the 
model s wil l be disconfirmed, That is, we know that model s of this 
type make predictions that are wrong. Logic thus compel s us to 
real ize that the "truth" of the model s is not necessaril y the onl y 
goal of the research effort because we al ready have the answer to that 
question. Instead the research question becomes the degree to which 
one model is better than another at capturing market behavior. 
Experiments shoul d be designed to make comparisons among model s 
whenever such comparisons are possible, Which model throws l ight on 
market behavior? Which model is true is a different question. 
II. PERFORMANCE OF MARKET MODELS 
If rational ity assumptions are totally unrel iable, then one 
would expect market model s based upon them to be simil arl y unrel iabl e. 
Preferences for outcomes might be induced by the procedures outlined 
above but it does not follow that the market suppl y and demand 
functions can be constructed from those preferences. An uncontrol led 
aspect of rational ity is required to go from preference to market 
demand, Or, demands and supplies might have been control led, but 
laboratory markets are complicated and invol ve expectations formation, 
strategy, etc. The demand and suppl y model itsel f might not work as a 
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predictor of price. Or, events in the market could overrride the 
incentives used. People simply might not be able to cope, become 
irritated, frustrated, etc. so easily that no market model would work. 
If people are erratic and/or irrational, the induced preferences will 
not guarantee the accuracy of economic models. 
Three different examples of market experiments are now 
summarized. Each relies upon different features of human. capacities. 
All are "success stories" in the sense that a mathematical model baaed 
upon principles of rational choice seems to capture much of what is 
observed, The replications of these experiments have occurred in 
enough similar situations that the inferences drawn from the examples 
probably reliably reflect the facts as opposed to outlying or 
fortuitous observations. 
Middlemen 
The first example comes from a paper by Plott and Uhl (1981) , 
The concern was with middlemen. A group of suppliers were each given 
a marginal coat function by application of induced preference theory. 
If price was constant and each followed the competitive optimizing 
response, the market supply curve would be as shown in figure 1 .  
[figure 1 here) 
Similarly, final buyers each had a derived demand. Should final 
buyers have responded in an optimizing fashion to a fixed price, the 
market demand would have been as shown in the figure. Each agent was 
assigned a different number to use as a name during the experiment. 
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The numbers on the market demand and supply functions refer to the 
agent who had the limit value at the indicated level. 
10 
Final buyers and suppliers were in different rooms and could 
neither trade nor communicate, A group of four middlemen 
(speculators) were allowed first to visit the suppliers ' room at which 
time a market A was opened. Having acquired inventories, the 
middlemen were then taken to the final buyers' room where they were 
able to sell in market B what they had previously purchased in market 
A. After market B was closed, the middlemen returned to market A to 
start a new period (of two markets) .  Inventories could not be carried 
forward to succeeding periods. Everything acquired in A had to be 
sold in B or forgotten. Both markets were organized in a manner 
similar to oral double auctions. 
If the individuals serving the middleman function were 
optimizers and correctly assessed the probability of sales in market 
B, then the prices in the two markets A and B should have approached 
equality. The level of price should have been at the demand and 
supply intersection. Profits of middlemen should have approached 
zero. The volume in both markets should have been fourteen units. It 
would be .fil!. if demanders and suppliers were in the same market and 
middlemen did not exist. 
Shown in the figure, the predictions of the model are 
approximately correct. Shown there is a time series of all contract 
prices in the order in which they occurred. With time and replication 
of periods the prices in both markets converged to the predicted 
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equilibrium price of $1 . 67. The predicted carry-forward of fourteen 
units was close to the actual volume. Profits of middlemen dissipated 
to near zero as predicted, 
From a practical perspective the competitive model works 
rather well when applied to the middleman markets. No model of which 
I am aware, baaed on principles other than some form of rationality, 
does as well as the competitive model. Indeed, in this simple 
example, there are many chances for things to go wrong. First notice 
that the theory of derived demand is working twice removed. Derived 
demand theory was used to postulate the market demand of final 
consumers as induced by the experimenter. Derived demand for a factor 
of production was used by middlemen when they purchased a "resource" 
from the sellers in room A and transformed it into a product for sale 
in room B. Notice that this transformation took place under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty, The middlemen did not know the 
demand function, prices, or any other aspect of the market (or market 
theory) , Somehow they assessed the consequences of their actions with 
reasonable accuracy. Once having acquired inventories the middlemen 
showed no evidence of falling prey to the sunk cost fallacy. When 
mistakes appeared to have been made, that is, when middlemen seem to 
have carried too much forward, the middlemen readily sold at a loss 
and recovered as much as possible, (In the first period one unit was 
carried forward and not sold but in subsequent periods this problem 
never occurred. ) Notice also that we have some confirmation of the 
"free riding" or "prisoner'  a dilemma" model as applied to public 
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goods. Middlemen had a common interest in keeping prices low in 
market A and high in market B. Outbidding a fellow middleman and 
gaining the associated personal profits is the market analog of free 
riding. These participants were not characterized by such a concern 
for fellow middlemen that they would forgo advantages of individual 
gain in order that the profits of all might be higher. Not only is 
there support here for a "rational" perspective, there is support for 
the additional proposition that these people in this setting were not 
naturally concerned about others. Or, if they were so concerned, it 
was not apparent in their collective actions, 
While the middleman type of market experiment suggests that 
elements of the rational agent model can capture much of the actual 
human behavior, we cannot assume that this is the end of the story. 
Even this simple market exhibits behavior that at beat is not 
predicted by the model and at worst is wholly inconsistent with the 
model, First notice that the model becomes accurate only af'ter a 
process of convergence. The model says nothing about that. Notice 
that the adjustment process contains events that are hard to reconcile 
with rationality, In the A markets, prices existed that were 
substantially below those observed in the previous A market and prices 
tended to move up during a period. Why did sellers simply not wait 
and capture the higher prices? Why in period 7.did the buyer pay 
$2 . 31 when such high prices had never been necessary before? Notice 
that in market B of periods 1 and 2 an excess demand existed but 
prices were below equilibrium. The model predicts equilibrium and in 
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periods one and two this did not occur. 
Auctions 
Some of the most extensive use of the precision afforded by 
rationality postulates is found in the auction literature. This 
example is of special importance because it is the only example of 
which I am aware that the full implications of rationality axioms has 
been deduced in operational terms in a form that can be examined by an 
experimenter. Put another way, this is the only example in all of 
economics where a reasonably complete theory about rational behavior 
in markets exists. 
Compare two types of sealed bid auctions in which a single 
item is to be sold, Each bidder tenders a single bid in private that 
is collected and examined (privately) by the market (auctioneer) . The 
object will be awarded to the highest bidder. If the auction is a 
first-price auction, the winning bidder will pay the amount of his own 
bid. If the auction is a second-price auction, the winner will pay 
the amount of the second highest bid. 
The scientific challenge is to compare the bids tendered in 
each type of market and, more am bitiously, to predict the bids 
tendered. Suppose N agents are participating and all participants 
know that vi, the value of the object to each bidder i, is drawn from 
a probability distribution with support on the interval [y,vJ. Notice 
three aspects of the challenge. First the institution can be viewed 
as a treatment variable so even if the theory' fails to predict 
individual agent behavior it still might add insight about market 
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behavior. When dealing with economics the role of the market as an 
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aspect of inquiry should always be kept in focus. Secondly it is the 
actions taken by agents and not their thoughts, thought processes, 
feelings, or attitudes that are to be studied. Finally, the concepts 
of value and probability that are frequently a cause for concern by 
critics of economics are built into the theory at the outset. 
An experimental approach to the problem was first developed by 
Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) and has since expanded 
dramatically, In order to appreciate the role of rationality in this 
investigation we will consider only a simple case. The values vi are 
independently drawn from a constant density on [0, 1) so by expressing 
bids as a fraction of the largest possible value any interval can be 
considered. Each agent. knows his own value before bidding but not the 
value of others. The above facts are public knowledge and can be 
controlled for experimental purposes, That is, auctions can actually 
be created that objectively have the requisite properties. 
How might one go about developing a model of the situation? 
The auction theory literature suggests that the system will behave as 
if the following are true : 
(i) Agents choose in accord with the expected utility hypothesis. 
In order to obtain a model that can be solved we will assume 
each player has a utility function of wealth Ui(y) ; y
r where r 
is distributed across the population by a publicly known 
probability distribution q on [0,1). The constant r is a risk 
aversion factor. This assumption will be treated as a 
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maintained hypothesis for purposes of analyzing the data and 
testing the theory. 
(ii) At the time of choice each agent, i, knows (vi, ri) ,  his own 
value and risk parameter, but knows only the probability 
distribution from which those of others were drawn. 
(iii) Each individual follows Bayes law in forming expectations. 
(iv) Each individual will choose a Nash equilibrium bidding 
function, 
(v) There are N agents, 
Under all of the above assumptions the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium bidding functions are 
i if the second-price auction is used, 
for all i if the first-price auction is used. 
The comparative institutional prediction is that the expected price 
1 5  
under the first-price auction is greater than the expected price under 
the second-price auction. 
Table 1 reproduces the results of some of Smith's experiments. The 
[table 1 here] 
range of the support function [O,V] was varied with N to keep expected
profits, as calculated by the model, the same as N increased, Notice 
first that the model is very accurate when applied to the second-price 
auction for N > 3, For example, if N = 6 the model predicts a mean 
price of 1 2. 1  and the actual price averaged 11 . 21 .  The predicted 
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variances are also close to those observed, As predicted by the 
model, people tend to bid their value when they participate in the 
1 6  
second-price auction, Secondly, notice that the prediction about the 
market treatment variable is also correct. The average price for the 
second-price auctions is below the average price of the first-price 
auctions for every value of N. The first-price auction generates more 
revenue as predicted. 
The risk neutral model (r = 1 )  tends to develop inaccuracies 
when applied to the magnitude of first-price auction bids. Of course, 
the risk neutrality parameter was not controlled in these experiments. 
In any case, prices in the first-price auction are higher than those 
predicted by the model if we assume r = 1 ,  If the data are tested 
against the risk averse model, which predicts that observed prices 
will be above the risk neutral prediction, for every value of N, the 
model cannot be rejected for N 3, 
The support for the Nash equilibrium based models has 
continued as research has expanded to a study of the multiple units 
case although the model has encountered difficulties for some values 
of N. For the single-unit case, however, the full Nash equilibrium 
model with all of its implicit and explicit rationality assumptions is 
the most accurate model that exists, To the extent that the model 
places restrictions on data it is consistent with the facts in an 
absolute sense. 
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Signaling 
The third example is a demonstration that the equilibrium 
notions motivated by concepts of optimizing behavior can capture the 
essence of very complicated and interdependent phenomena. The model 
1 7  
itself was originally motivated by a cynical view of education (Spence 
1 974) . Imagine a world in which education has no intrinsic value but 
is very costly in terms of time and effort to all but the smartest 
people. By paying an appropriate premium for educated employees, 
employers can make education a profitable investment for smart people 
but not for others. Thus, the employers can hire just the people they 
wish (smart) by paying a premium for an attribute they do not value 
(education) , Theoretically, the employers can do this even though the 
intelligence level of the prospective employee, prior to employment, 
can be observed by no one other than the employee himself, and when 
asked, a prospective employee has an incentive to lie. 
The point of the exercise is not to explore the 
appropriateness of the reasoning when applied to investments in 
education. The purpose is to explore the nature of equilibrium when 
such asymmetric information exists in markets. We inquire about the 
appropriateness of equilibrating principles that are asserted to be 
operative and the ability of mathematical statements to capture them. 
The example was intended only to help one understand the 
laboratory market that was created. In the laboratory market, several 
sellers have two units each of a commodity which can be sold. The 
units have two characteristics : grade which can be either Regular (R) 
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or Super (S) and quality, which is initially zero but can be added by 
the seller. Grade is like a {dumb, smart) variable and quality is 
like education that can be added at cost. A seller' s  two units are 
either both R or both s. Half of the sellers have R ' s and the other 
half have S's as determined randomly and secretly before any trading 
begins. Before purchase N buyers can observe quality added but the 
underlying grade is discovered only after purchase and after the 
market period is closed. 
Buyers like Supers better than Regulars, and buyers place some 
value on any additional quality added by sellers (i. e. , education has 
some value) . In particular for each unit purchased, buyers hav e the 
following value (determined by the experimenter by using the 
techniques of induced preference described in the introduction) : 
V(g, q) G(g) + Q(q) 
g e {R, S) = (Regular, Super) 
q e [0, m) quality added by seller 
G(g) 
Q(q) 
{
$2. so if g = s 
$.so if g = R 
{
$. 2 05q - $.oosq2 if q i 20
$[( . 2 05) (20) - ( . 005) (202) ]  + $.Olq if q > 20
Sellers face costs of adding quality of $.15q and $. 02 q  if the 
units are Regulars or Supers respectively. It costs less to add q 
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(get educated) if the unit is a Super (smart) . 
The most efficient signaling equilibrium is a fascinating 
concept when considered from a rationality perspective. The 
equilibrium is defined by the following equations: 
1 9  
(1) (i) All Regulars will be produced at the same quality qR and will 
sell at the same price PR. 
(ii) All Supers will be produced at the same quality qs and will
sell at the same price PS. 
These two conditions follow from an underlying axiom requiring that no 
arbitrage exists. If different prices and qualities existed within 
grades, then profit opportunities would exist and rational agents 
would take advantage of them. 
(2) (i) V(R, qR) = PR 
(ii) V(S, qs> = Ps 
These equations pick up two aspects of behavior. First, having 
observed the quality level QR or qs the buyer can infer the grade R or 
S with certainty. Quality and grade are perfectly correlated. 
Secondly, once this is known the demand and supply model under 
certainty becomes applicable. For any unit with characteristics (g, q) 
a horizontal demand exists. Recall that the values of consumers were 
defined .ll.fil:'. unit, so without budget constraints and with prices below 
value and no uncertainty, the buyer would want an infinite quantity of 
all possible commodities. The limited supply (vertical supply curve) 
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and horizontal demand curve drives prices to the maximum, i. e. , the 
demand price. 
(3) (i) PR - . lSqR l Ps - . 1 Sqs 
(ii) PS - . 02 qs l PR - . 02 qR 
20 
These two conditions require that truthful revelation is incentive 
compatible. Regular sellers maximize profits by selling units at the 
quality level recognized by buyers as Regulars. Super sellers 
maximize profits by selling units at quality levels recognized by 
buyers as Supers. 
(4) max([V(R, QR) - . lSqR] + [V(S, qs> - . 02qs
ll 
subject to (1 ) ,  (2) , (3) . 
This condition captures a type of "market rationality". It says that 
profits of the system will be maximized subject to the behavioral 
constraints defined in (1 ) ,  (2) , and (3) . 
In less opaque terms, the final condition (4) can be 
interpreted as another type of demand and supply condition. The qs 
and QR will be adjusted to reflect gains from exchange. The 
maximization formulation captures the idea that this adjustment in the 
quality levels of the commodity will continue until further 
adjustments would negate the signaling value implicit in (1) .  The 
idea is explained geometrically in figure 2 .  The value functions for 
[figure 2 here] 
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a single buyer are drawn for Regulars and Supers. The increases in 
value with additional quality are as shown. Equation (2) says the 
price of an S will be along the top curve and the price of an R will 
be along the bottom curve. The qualities, QR and qs must be such that
they are not equal and thereby signal to the buyer the underlying 
grade. The qualities should also be located such that sellers of R ' s  
have no interest in marketing their units at (Ps, qs>• etc. as demanded 
by (2) . Finally QR should be located to maximize system profits and
qs should be the minimum possible level consistent with (2) . A check
of the equations will demonstrate that (qR, qS) = (6, 27) ,  as shown in 
the figure, have the requisite properties. 
Twelve markets with the above (and related) parameters were 
reported in Miller and Plott (198S) .  The results were mixed in the 
sense that other variations of the model outlined above were more 
accurate than that particular model. However, the interesting thing 
from the perspective of this paper is that the model captured any of 
the market data at all; yet, in two of the eleven markets this 
complicated model that is filled with rationality postulates, is very 
accurate. The data points are shown in figure 2 near the predicted 
equilibrium. T he quality of Regulars, QR, is correct and the quality 
of supers, qs, is a little too high. Variances in qualities and
prices are very low. Prices are slightly below the predicted level 
reflecting a frequently observed property of markets that agents will 
not trade for zero reward. Behavior of the type described in this 
model is certainly not beyond human or market capabilities. 
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III. EX POST RATIONALIZATION (REPARAMETERIZATION) 
When markets perform in unusual or unexpected ways, the 
rationality postulates suggest hypotheses to explain why. The 
econometrics and field studies literature are filled with ex post 
rationalization techniques, but very little has been said about them 
in laboratory economics papers. 
The idea of reparameterization is important in a second way. 
2 2  
Rationality at a market level analysis can be separated from 
rationality at the individual level. Suppose that the market model 
works well given the individual agent's personal decision rules and 
that from observed market behavior we can make some reasonable 
inferences about what actual individual decision rules must have been. 
Suppose further that from induced preference theory we have some idea 
about what a rational individual's decision rule would have been. By 
comparing the inferred actual with the hypothesized rational we can 
perhaps develop a methodology for testing the latter as they are 
relevant for economics. 
To demonstrate how rationality principles can be used in this 
capacity, the data from four experiments are analyzed. These are 
experiments that would have been discarded because of (allegedly) poor 
experimental control. These experiments were done in the mid-sixties 
and early seventies before some of the experimental techniques 
currently used had been developed. They are all oral auction markets 
that differed in various ways from the oral double auction now in use. 
Each trader had two units and could tender an all or none offer. 
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Offers remained open until canceled or taken. The instructions were 
not administered carefully. No teats on procedures or practice rounds 
were allowed. The accounting was not checked for confused or cheating 
participants, etc. In essence, the current operational procedures for 
making certain that subjects understand the reward medium and the 
market technology were not followed • • • or so we would like to 
believe. 
The nature of the markets was to induce simple demand and 
supply functions different from those that had previously been 
examined. Multiple units were also present, which at the time of the 
experiments had not been studied. The question posed was whether or 
not the observed prices and volume would converge to the equilibrium 
predictions of the model. 
The answer was a rather resounding "no. " The initial 
parameters are shown as the solid line demand and supply functions in 
figures 3 and 4. For the most part the data are well removed from the 
[figures 3 and 4 here] 
predictions of the model. 
Whenever data are trashed, a danger exists that the principles 
that guided the models are the problem and not the lack of parametric 
control. However, when examining subjects'  decisions, many seemed to 
violate the intuitive notions of rationality stemming from confusion 
or a willingness to violate the rules of the market. 
An exercise was undertaken to "reparameterize" the 
experiments. We wished to provide a method of adjusting individual 
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preference parameters in light of their choices and determine the 
extent to which the revised market model fits the data. The rules 
used were as follows:  
A.  If  a buyer (seller) buys (sells) a unit for more (leas) than the 
redemption value (coat) of the unit then the limit price is 
adjusted to the transaction price. 
B, If an agent never bid or traded during the entire experiment and 
passed up profitable opportunities (suitably defined) then the 
parameters are adjusted as if the agent were not present. 
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c. If an agent failed to trade for two consecutive periods and passed
up profitable opportunities (suitably defined) then the limit
prices are revised to equal the highest (lowest) bid to buy (offer
to sell) that the agent tendered or accepted for that unit in any
period throughout the experiment. 
D. If an agent transacts for more units than the maximum permitted 
then the units are adjusted to the maximum number of such extra 
units traded in any period and the limit prices are the highest 
(lowest) price paid (received) for those units during the entire 
experiment. 
The revised demand and supplies are the dotted curves in 
figures 3 and 4. The price predictions of the revised model fit much 
better than the original in three of the four cases and in the fourth 
case the price predictions are identical, The volume figures are 
worse after reparameterization because in all cases the actual volume 
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was l ow relative to the original model and the revised parameters 
predicted even lower vol ume. 
2S  
The exercise demonstrates two properties of  rational ity baaed 
theories. First, the adjustment of parameters need not induce 
circul arity in the reasoning. Ex post theories baaed on rational ity 
can certainl y be rejected. For example, the observed vol ume can be 
used to reject the revised model . Secondly, in view of subsequent 
experimentation, the decision to discard the data was probabl y 
correct. If these subjects are "equivalent" to those used in 
subsequent experiments and if the market organization had no special 
effects then the actual preferences used by the subjects were not 
those the experimenter attempted to induce. If preferences are 
stable, we know now that under the doubl e oral auction prices converge 
to the competitive equil ibrium. Thus subsequent experiments tell us 
that the markets in the figures above had adjusted to the actual 
preferences. Even if participants are confused and "irrational " from 
certain perspectives, the market model can stil l be appl ied. 
The onl y other attempt to revise parameters of a market model 
based on decisions made during the experiment is ongoing work by Knez, 
Smith, and Wil l iams (198S) . They have attempted to measure individual 
attitudes during a market, and to use those parameters for prediction 
they tested a market model baaed on measured parameters against the 
model with parameters as specified � priori by the experimenter. The 
markets themsel ves are for l otteries in which subjects stated their 
limit prices, maximum (minimum) wil lingness to pay (sel l) ,  prior to 
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the opening of each market period. Their conclusions are: (1) the act 
of measurement does not appear to affect the market; (2) the market 
model drawn from the measured parameters is more accurate than the 
model constructed from induced preferences; (3) many subjects (in the 
40 percent range) exhibited a wil lingness to violate their own stated 
limit prices. Knez, Smith, and Wil l iams suggest that the el icited 
parameters are anal ogous to guesses about how subjects wil l trade or 
perhaps simil ar to wishes as opposed to true l imit prices. 
Neverthel ess, the measured parameters improve predictions about market 
prices. 
IV. NEW INSTITUTIONS 
The rational ity postulates have been useful in suggesting new 
institutional arrangements that have never before existed. The 
research on public goods provision mechanisms is a good example. 
Other examples incl ude the work by Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1981) on 
the al location of l anding rights by auction or the work by Raaaanti, 
Smith, and Bul fin (1982) on a combinatorial auction to sol ve the same 
problem, Experimental methods have been the onl y source of data about 
how these new institutions might perform. 
An interesting exampl e, with possibly limited social 
usefulness, are the unstabl e dollar auctions. 4 The idea is to create 
processes that appl ications of rational ity theory suggests wil l have 
bizarre properties. In this case the objective is to attempt to sel l 
a dollar to perfectl y informed peopl e for much more than a doll ar. 
Intuitivel y it seems that rational consumers woul d never do such a 
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thing, but intuition is not al ways a rel iable scientific tool . 
Subjects, after having attended an economics experiment, are 
frequentl y in a room calcul ating their earnings. Having cal culated 
their earnings, and having not yet been paid, a dol lar auction is 
announced. Subjects are carefully tol d that an Engl ish auction wil l 
be used. The market wil l stop if forty-five seconds elapses after a 
bid with no intervening bid. The dollar will be given to the highest 
bidder but the second highest bidder must pay the amount of his own 
bid. That is, high bidder gets the dollar but the second high bidder 
pays for it. Bids cannot exceed the amount earned in the previous 
experiment. No talking is al lowed. 
The game is not wel l understood from a game theoretic 
perspective. The version with unl imited budgets and unl imited time 
has no sol ution except infinite bids. With l imitations on endowments, 
under no circumstances can nonparticipation by everyone be a Nash 
equil ibrium. Model s of the situation exist in which a sol ution 
invol ves participation from everyone and everyone shoul d be prepared 
to bid-their endowment. 5 The point is that model s based on concepts of 
rational ity suggest that rational people might produce intuitivel y 
impossible or perhaps irrational resul ts {i. e. selling a doll ar for 
much more than a dollar) . 
The data from five such auctions are in figure S. The dots
[figure s here] 
are the actual bids in dol lars as they occurred in sequence. As can 
be seen the dol lar al ways sol d for much more than a dollar. In 
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auction 1 for example, the dol lar went to a bid of $27.00 and the 
price actual ly paid by the second highest bidder was $20. 00. Some of 
the rel evant data are in the table at the bottom of the figure. In 
auction 1 the person with the l argest endowment had $40. 00. The 
auction winner had the sixth l argest endowment at $27. 54 . The person 
who paid $20. 00 had an endowment of $20. 70. These were the onl y two 
bidders after the fourteenth bid of $8. 00. Frequentl y, the auction 
stopped onl y after a bidder hit a constraint. The individual who 
acquired the doll ar tended to have an above average endowment. On the 
average, people l ost a great deal of money. 
The phenomenon suggested by the model s actual ly exists. The 
data contain three interesting l essons. First, model s of rational 
choice hel p us l ook beyond the market organizations that have evol ved 
through history to find institutions that might be capabl e of 
performing some specific task. One might imagine nobler tasks than to
sel l a dollar for more than a dollar but that is not the issue. 
Secondl y, the existence of intuitivel y "irrational" market behavior is 
not conclusive evidence that model s based on concepts of individual 
rational ity are inappropriate or il l-equipped to be useful in 
appl ications. Final ly, the exampl e demonstrates that model s based 
upon optimization principl es are filled with subtleties often 
unappreciated by critics of rational ity. As far as I am aware, the 
game described above has never been sol ved with any degree of 
general ity. We do not know some of the major properties of the Nash 
equil ibrium strategies shoul d they exist. Given the current 
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development of theory, the data cannot be used either to confirm or 
reject a theory. 
V. PENDING PROBLE}!S 
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The review above contains no  examples of  the failure of an 
economic model to successfully confront the data. I do not want to 
leave the reader with the impression that such examples do not exist. 
Thia section is intended to disabuse anyone of the notion that our 
models are in perfect shape and that the rationality foundation needs 
neither examination nor modification. Many problems and paradoxes 
exist. The paper was not organized around the failure of the models 
because the reasons for the failures are not clear. Arguments like 
those in Section III that show differences of procedures and 
incentives as explanations for unexpected market behavior are very 
much in contention with arguments that would change entirely the way 
we think about economics. 
The potential problems with rational choice models that have 
been identified by psychologists and that might be manifest in market 
behavior have not been systematically explored, This lack of study 
reflects a resource constraint and not a lack of interest or 
enthusiasm. Two exceptions to the general rule exist currently and I 
understand that more attempts to study markets for evidence of 
"heuristics" are underway. 
In an experimental study by Plott and Wilde (1982) the 
"representativeness" heuristic (Tveraky and Kahneman 1 974) was given 
an opportunity to work. Subjects had valuations for commodity units 
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that were contingent on an underlying state of nature. Prior 
probabilities were generated by a bingo cage. Once a state of nature 
was chosen (one for each buyer) a clue to the state was generated by a 
draw from a second bingo cage, 'The distribution governing the draws 
from the second cage was contingent upon the state determined by the 
first draw. After receiving their personal clue, buyers would 
participate in a market in which the units were being sold. After 
this process was repeated for several periods, during which the market 
equilibrated in the usual fashion, the market supply was shifted. The 
representativeness heuristic predicted no change in volume due to the 
lowered price. In reality alight increases occurred as would be 
anticipated from risk averse expected utility behavior with Bayesian 
agents. 
A more direct examination of the base rate fallacy has been 
conducted by Duh and Sunder (1985) . The experiment was similar to 
the Plott and Wilde experiment but the supply was completely inelastic 
thereby letting price serve as a measure of valuation and the markets 
were organized differently. The experiments also varied the base rate 
to see if the markets responded appropriately. A model based on the 
principle that base rates would be ignored was rejected in favor of a 
model based on the principle that people would follow Bayes law. 
The present lack of support in experimental markets for the 
psychology baaed ideas is not going to be the end of the story. Many 
properties of markets have been observed that are not explicable in 
terms of current models. Posted prices have an independent effect on 
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market prices (Plott and Smith 1978) . Nonbinding price ceilings 
affect market convergence (Isaac and Plott 1981) , Bubbles can be 
observed in asset markets (Plott and Sunder 1983; Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams 1986) , The dynamics of the convergence process in 
equilibrating markets is not theoretically understood at all, In fact 
we have only begun to develop a theory based upon individual strategic 
decisions about why equilibrium is attained in any experimental 
markets where equilibrium has been observed (Easley and Ledyard 1983, 
Friedman 1984, Wilson 1982) , The Dutch auction behaves differently 
from the first-price auction even though they are supposed to be 
behaviorally isomorphic (Coppinger, Smith, and Titus 1980) , The 
signaling experiments discussed above contain events that suggest some 
of the markets studied failed to incorporate information that was 
clearly present in a statistical sense, The markets appeared to 
adjust appropriately only after a change in experimental procedure 
drew attention to the statistical regularity. The questions that now 
exist about the need for economists to consider the decision process 
used by individuals in addition to observed choices are likely to 
occur with increasing frequency, 
The role of morality, altruism, and ethical predispositions in 
forming choice is another area of potential discoveries. Needless to 
say there has been no way of separating theories of altruistically 
based behavior and moralistic behavior from preference theory or 
rational choice theories. Furthermore, since preference theory 
requires no theory about the source of preferences, no overriding need 
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for a separate theory of moral behavior has been solidly demonstrated. 
The fact that preferences might include or reflect moral 
considerations does not, on the surface, contradict a theory of 
rational choice or maximizing behavior. Moral considerations might 
influence the shape and form of preferences but that does not 
contradict the existence of preferences or choices based on them. One 
can argue that the existence of morally based behavior provides 
evidence of rational choice. Experimental markets with externalities, 
public goods decision processes and related commons dilemma 
experiments have not shown the domination of moral considerations over 
financial motivation. Thus no review of procedures and theories has 
been forced upon experimentalists. Nevertheless, evidence of morally 
based decisions does exist (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1985) . In committee 
experiments the evidence is pronounced especially when as few as three 
participants are involved (Isaac and Plott 1978; Eavey and Miller 
1984) . Furthermore, a methodology for investigating experimentally 
the phenomena and related theories of moral choices is being explored, 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985) formulate a strong case that it is possible 
to formulate in operational terms competing theories about moral 
attitudes and it is possible to use experimental techniques to assess 
their relative accuracy. How our models of rational choice become 
modified to include the technical features of moral attitudes 
(consistent? myopic? stable? sensitivity and responsiveness of choice 
to evidence?) if such exist, remains an open question. 
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1. The classical hypothesis is taken to be that attitudes of
preference can be represented by total, reflexive, negatively
acyclic binary relations. For generalizations and alternatives to 
this hypothesis see Aizerman ( 1985 ) .
2. Only two examples exist. Once problems were detected along this
line, subsequent experiments used mor e incentives. The committee
experiments studied by Fiorina and Plott ( 19 78 )  used incentives as
a control. Means and va.riances were affected substantially. 
Plott and .Smith ( 19 78 )  demonstrate that traders tend not to trade 
units for which positive profits will not be made. Just breaking
even is not enough.
3. I' m aware of one documented example of a problem caused by the 
descr iptions of the alternatives. In Cohen, Levine, and Plott
( 19 78 )  subjects were inv olved in a voting experiment. .The obj ects
of choice (letters of the alphabet) were labeled in humorous ways.
Traditional financial incentives were also operative. The group 
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choice model , which had worked well i n  other experiments , was 
working badly so subj ects were asked to expl ain the reasons for 
their vote s .  The recorded votes and the reasons given b y  subjects 
indicated that subjects neglected the f inancial incentives and 
chose in ways they imagined reasonable in light of the humorous 
descriptions of the options. 
4. This auction process first appears in print in Shubik ( 197 1 ) .  In
s .  
conversatio n  Shubik t el l s  me that he hesitates to take full credit
for h aving invented the process because many unusual processes
were proposed i n  conversations among game theor ists at Princeton 
i n  the early 19 S Os .  The theorists were using game theory to 
invent processes in which rational behavior by individuals would 
lead to surprising behavior. 
A complete game theor etic treatment of the auction i s  not 
avail abl e .  Kim Border and Joel Sobel ( private correspondence ) 
have produced the fol lowing model . The insight of the model is to 
treat the auction like a seal ed bid auction. The sealed bid is 
interpreted as a reservation price above which the subject wil l 
not go during the actual English auction bidding process. 
Consider only the two person case for exposition purposes with the 
rules : 
( i )  High bidder r eceives $1 and pays nothing. 
( ii)  Second high bidder receives O and pays his bid. 
( iii)  Bids must be nonnegative and no more than weal th. 
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( iv )  Common knowledge is that wealth is i. i.d. from cdf F ( · ) 
supported on [ O , A J  and has conti nuous density f ( · ) . 
Let 
V ( x ) = ( 1  + x ) F (x )  - x 
M (W)  = max ( x  � W : x max ' s  V on [ O , W] } 
b (W)  = W - V(M(W) ) - V(W) using the convention that if F (W)1 - F (W)  1 then 
V(M(W) )  - V(W) 
1 - F (W)  o .
The bidding function b ( W) is the equilibrium strategy of a 
symmetri c ,  Bayesian Nash equil i brium with risk neutral pl ay ers . 
General ization to N bidders is straightforward. 
As an example consider the two person case in which F (. ) 
is uniform over [0 , A ] . The optimum bidding function is 
b(W) 
if W 2 A - 1 
if W < A  - 1 ,
In this case the equil ibrium strategy is to be prepared t o  bid al l 
of your wealth if your wealth is one less than the maximum 
possible wealth. Border has also produced an example in which the 
optimal strategy is for al l bidders to always bid al l of their 
weal th. 
TABLE 1 
THEOR ETICAL PR EDI CT ION S AND MEANS AN D VAR I AN CES POOL ED OV ER n MARKETS 
First Seco nd 
Observed Risk neut r al ( r  ;;;; 1 )  Observed
N Stati sti cs Price Theoreti cal Price Theor e ti cal 
3 mean 2 . 4 4  ( n = 7 0 )  2 . 5 1 . 97 2 . 5
variance • 5 89 . 3  84 • 7 5 9
• 96 
4 mean 5 . 6 4  ( n 6 0 )  4 . 9  
variance 1 . 8 0  
• 96
5 mean 9 . 1 4  ( n 6 0) 8 . 1 
variance 1 . 3 7 1 . 83 
6 mean 1 3 . 2 2  ( n = 6 0) 1 2 . 1  1 1 . 2 1 1 2 . 1  
vari ance 4 . 3 1  3 . 0 8 . 2 0  6 . 4 
9 mean 3 1 . 02 ( n 3 0) 2 8 . 9 2 7 . 02 2 8 . 9
variance 4 . 91 8 . 3  8 1 8 . 6 6  1 8 .  8 5  
Source : C ox ,  R obers o n ,  and Smith ( 1 9 82 ) . 
$2.60 
s 
2 .40 
D 
1 3  
2.20 
44 
F I G U R E I 
Market Parameters and Price Time Series 
Market Contract Prices in Sequence of Occurrence 
PERIOD 5 PERIOD 6 PERIOD 7 P E R IOD 8 
,-_;..; ___ ....;:..._+-.._;,.;._--,---=--+-_;..;----=---lf--......:..;�--r-...:;...-.f--�
A:..;__.,.-�B--4--�A---r-�B:..._-4--�A:.,__--r-�B:..._-4--�A,;__...., $2.00 
I 
I 
1.00 
0.80 .__ __ ...._ ___ .....__ __ _. 
0 10 20 30 
Units 
I I 
: I I 
! JV\\ :� : - - -7-- --F---1-- t;-.;.t"""-+----L--�---t:·�\M.---
1 V I I 
I I I 
I I I 
1 3  
$ 1 .63 
0.043 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
1 3  
$1 .72 
0.029 
1 3  
$1 .65 
0,020 
1 3  
$1 .73  
0,033 
1 4  
$ 1 .67 
0.01 3 
1 4  
$1 .69 
0,01 4 
- - - - - - EQUI LIBR I UM = 1 .67 
A :  Middlemen buy 
B :  Midd lemen sel l  
1 .80 
1 .60 
1 .40 
1 4  Volume
$1 .69 Mean price 
0,02 1 Variance 
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FI GURE 2 Mod el Parame t e rs and Pred ic t ions Di s played wi t h Ac t ual E>toer imen tal Ou t co""'' 
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F I GU R E 3 
Paramet ers of Initia l  and Revised Mode
ls,  Predictions, and Price
 Time Series of Two Experimen tal Mark e t s
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F I G U R E  4 
Parameters of Initial and Revised Models, Predictions , and Price Time Series of Two Experimen tal Marke ts 
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2000 ----. 
I 
... , 
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2 3 4 
PER I O D  
( 1 4 )  ( I I )  ( 12)  ( 1 3 )  
( VOLUME ) 
3 4 
P E R I OD 
(26) (23) 
(VO L U M E ) 
5 6 7 
(25) ( 18) ( 19 ) 
1 
PCC ( Plott ) 
14 participants 
L1 = $40 . 00 
LW = L6 = $27 . 56 
L L = L16 = $20 .70
8w = $27 .oo 
BL = $20.00
only 6 ,16 beginning with 
B = $8.00 ( 14th bid ) 
8 people bid 
at least once 
F I G U R E  5 
B i d  T i m<'  St_• r i L' S  from F i VL' J>o l J ;1r i\t 1 c t  i on s  
$ 35 
30 
25 
20 
1 5  I-
14 >-
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1 2 1-
I I � 
1 0 �  
9 � 
a �  ...... ··· 
1 �  
6 �  
5 >-
4 �  
31-
2 
-· 
2 
PCC ( Plott ) 
14 participants 
L1 = $30,87 
LW = L1 3  = $23 .07 
LL = L6 = $25 . 44 
8w = $2 .oo 
BL = $1 . 51 
. · 
only 6 , 13  beginning with 
B = $1 . 02 ( Sth bid) 
people bid 
at least once 
2 
I 
-
�· 
3 
PCC ( Plott ) 
participants 
L1 = $31 . 6 8  
LW = L1 = $31 . 6 8
LL = L = $11 . 2 8s 
8w = $1 .00 
BL = $5 .63
only 1 ,  5 beginning with 
B = $ . 52 ( 9th bid )
people bid 
at least once 
.· 
.
... 
. .,,-··· 
.
.
. 
I .. · .. 
4 5 
4 
CIT ( Pl o t t )  
14 participants 
Li = $41 . 70 
Lw = Ls = $21 .30  
LL = Li t = $15 .05
8w = $16 .00 
BL = h 5 . oo 
only s , 11  beginning with 
B = $2 .00 ( 3rd bid )
4 people bid 
at least once 
Claremont Grad School ( Pl o t t )  
11 participants 
Li = h4 .70  
Lw = L3 = h t . 90 
LL = L6 = ht .20 
8w = $11 .so  
BL = $11 . 20
only 3 ,6  beginning with 
B = $ii .20 ( 1 9th bid )
people bid 
at least once 
4 8  
